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Comment 
Aligning Online Privacy Protection with 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: How Joffe 
Can Be Used to Modernize the Wiretap Act 
Matthew Mason* 
Between May 2007 and 2010, as part of its popular Street 
View project, Google collected an enormous amount of Wi-Fi 
data transmitted from unencrypted networks throughout the 
United States and over thirty countries worldwide.1 After 
initially denying the collection of any payload data,2 Google 
publicly acknowledged that fragmented samples of payload 
data were collected from open Wi-Fi networks due to a code 
mistakenly included in its Street View software.3 Several 
months later, however, Google admitted that the data collected 
was not just fragmentary in nature;4 in some instances the full 
content of e-mails, URL searches, passwords, and financial 
transactions were collected.5 In response to what has been 
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 1. Google Inc., 27 FCC Rcd. 4012, 4012 (Apr. 13, 2013) (notice of 
apparent liability) [hereinafter FCC Notice]; see In re Google Inc. Street View 
Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 2. In re Google, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (describing how Google claimed, 
on April 27, 2010, that only SSIDs and MAC addresses were collected). 
 3. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4012 (providing that Google 
acknowledged the collection of fragmented payload data on May 14, 2010). 
“[I]t’s now clear that we have been mistakenly collecting samples of payload 
data . . . even though we never used that data in any Google products.” Id. at 
4015 (quoting Alan Eustace, WiFi Data Collection: An Update, GOOGLE 
OFFICIAL BLOG, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/wifi-data-collection-
update.html (last updated June 9, 2010)). 
 4. Id. at 4012–13 (explaining how Google admitted for the first time that 
non-fragmented payload data was indeed captured). 
 5. Id. 
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called a “big brother-like . . . invasion of privacy,”6 
investigations have been launched in the United States7 and 
abroad.8 
In a private action against Google, the Northern District of 
California denied Google’s motion to dismiss a claim alleging 
that Google’s collection of payload data from unencrypted Wi-Fi 
networks violated the Wiretap Act.9 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that Wi-Fi communications do not constitute 
an “electronic communication . . . readily accessible to the 
general public” under the Wiretap Act, and thus are not exempt 
from liability.10 
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Joffe v. Google, Inc. raises a 
number of important issues that may have significant 
implications on privacy protections for Internet and other 
electronic communication. Joffe exposed our current privacy 
protection framework as inadequate for new technologies and 
advancements in communication. Such inadequacy raises the 
question as to what extent, and in what way, Congress must 
update the Wiretap Act to accommodate a changing 
communication landscape since the enactment of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) in 1986.11 Furthermore, it 
becomes necessary to consider whether users of unsecured    
                                                          
 6. Cecilia Kang, Growing Anger over Google Street View Privacy Breach, 
POST TECH. (May 20, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
posttech/2010/05/the_anger_is_growing_over.html (quoting Washington D.C. 
Council Member Jim Graham). 
 7. Juliana Gruenwald, FTC Drops Probe of Google Wi-Fi Snooping, 
NAT’L J., http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/ftc-drops-probe-of-google-wi-fi-
snooping-20101027 (last updated Oct. 27, 2010, 3:42 PM); Kristena Hansen, 
37 States Join Probe into Google Wi-Fi Data Collection, L.A. TIMES (July 21, 
2010, 1:46 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2010/07/google-
street-view.html; Amy Schatz & Amir Efrati, FCC Investigating Google Data 
Collection, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2010, 2:01 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052748704804504575606831614327598. 
 8. See FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4019, 4023–24 (citing Canadian, 
French, and Dutch investigations which all concluded that Google’s collection 
of payload data violated applicable data protection or online privacy laws). 
 9. In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 
1067, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Wiretap Act), Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 
213–14 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012)). 
 10. Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2012)). 
 11. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. 
No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848. 
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Wi-Fi networks have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their transmitted electronic communications. As a corollary, it 
is important to examine how offline Fourth Amendment 
principles may be applied to an increasingly online society to 
protect an individual’s electronic and Internet communications. 
This Comment seeks to examine how Congress, and the 
courts, might use Joffe as a springboard to bring privacy 
protections up to date with technological and communication 
advances. Part I will summarize how Wi-Fi communication 
works and the accompanying threats to privacy, examine the 
current statutes that protect against the interception of 
communications, summarize the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) investigation of the Street View incident, and assess the 
current protection for online communication under the Wiretap 
Act as well as basic principles of privacy law. Part II will 
comment on the reasoning and holding advanced by the Joffe 
court, and place Joffe in context with the current state of the 
law as described in Part I. Finally, Part III will argue that 
Congress and courts should use Joffe to align the reality of 
users’ knowledge of Wi-Fi technology and reasonable 
expectations of privacy with the Wiretap Act. This Comment 
concludes that Congress should amend the ECPA to expressly 
protect both encrypted and unencrypted Wi-Fi transmissions, 
and that courts should adapt offline Fourth Amendment 
principles to protect online and other electronic 
communications. 
I. UNDERSTANDING CURRENT WI-FI TECHNOLOGY, 
ON- AND OFFLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION, AND THE FCC 
GOOGLE INVESTIGATION 
A. WI-FI TECHNOLOGY, PACKET SNIFFING, AND LOCATION DATA 
Wi-Fi constitutes any kind of wireless local area network 
that uses radio waves to connect laptops and other devices to 
the Internet.12 Wi-Fi networks operate on Industrial, Scientific, 
                                                          
 12. Brief of Appellant Google Inc. at 3, Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262 
(9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-17483) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant]; Mani Potnuru, 
Note, Limits of the Federal Wiretap Act’s Ability to Protect Against Wi-Fi 
Sniffing, 111 MICH. L. REV. 89, 93 (2012). 
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and Medial (ISM) radio bands.13 Wireless networks use 
different ISM band frequency ranges, with each range further 
divided into channels.14 Wi-Fi enables point-to-point 
communication between specific devices, sent directly from one 
device to another.15 A wireless access point (WAP) connects to a 
user’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) through a wired 
connection and communicates over radio frequencies to devices 
equipped with a Wi-Fi adapter.16 The WAP only allows 
authenticated devices to associate with, and use, the Wi-Fi 
network.17 
To facilitate communication with other devices, the WAP 
transmits a signal providing basic information about the Wi-Fi 
network.18 The transmitted information includes a device’s 
medium access control (MAC) address,19 and service set 
identifier (SSID).20 A device’s MAC address and SSID are 
unencrypted,21 and can be automatically detected by most 
computers and smartphones.22 Devices capable of Wi-Fi 
connectivity use the MAC address and SSID to connect with a 
WAP and communicate over the Internet.23 
                                                          
 13. See Potnuru, supra note 12, at 93 (providing that ISM bands are 
unregulated frequencies which are part of the radio spectrum that may be 
used by anyone). 
 14. See id. at 93–94 (explaining that each wireless network is “configured 
to operate on one of these channels”). 
 15. Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) 
in Support of Appellees and Urging Affirmance at 9, Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 
F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-17483) [hereinafter EPIC Brief]. 
 16. See Potnuru, supra note 12, at 93 (comparing a WAP to a short-range 
cell tower, and Wi-Fi adapters to radio receivers). 
 17. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 22. Authenticated devices are able to 
connect to the Internet and each other through the WAP. FCC Notice, supra 
note 1, at 4014–15. 
 18. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4014–15; Brief of Appellant, supra note 
12, at 4. 
 19. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4015. A MAC address is a numeric 
identifier for each WAP. Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 4. 
 20. An SSID identifies the particular wireless local area network (LAN). 
FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4015. 
 21. Id. (explaining that a device’s MAC address and SSID are considered 
non-content data). 
 22. Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 4. 
 23. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4015. 
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Wi-Fi networks are either encrypted or unencrypted.24 
Network owners commonly forgo encryption for a variety of 
reasons,25 such as to foster public access to information,26 lack 
of technological expertise,27 and the fact that users must 
affirmatively enable mechanisms to ensure encryption.28 
Additionally, technological limitations make it difficult to 
create a secured, encrypted network within a public hotspot.29 
Regardless of encryption, Wi-Fi communications are coded and 
sent only to specific destinations.30 The transmitted data 
becomes encapsulated into frames, which are then fragmented 
and sent over the Wi-Fi network.31 Wi-Fi signals travel short 
distances, usually only enough to cover one’s home.32 
Despite the coded nature of Wi-Fi transmissions, packet 
sniffing presents a significant privacy threat to electronic 
communications sent over a wireless network. In essence, 
packet sniffers are a type of wiretap applied to Wi-Fi networks 
in order to monitor, intercept, and read data of transmitted 
electronic communications.33 Packet sniffers have the ability to 
collect and read e-mails, web searches, passwords, financial 
                                                          
 24. Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 5. Encryption permits a user to 
ensure that communication made over the network remains private. Potnuru, 
supra note 12, at 94 (citing password protection as an example of encryption, 
making interception very difficult, if not nearly impossible). 
 25. Brief of Appellant, supra note 12, at 5. 
 26. Id.; Bruce Schneier, Steal This Wi-Fi, WIRED (Jan. 10, 2008), 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2008/01/s
ecuritymatters_0110. 
 27. Potnuru, supra note 12, at 94–95. 
 28. Id. at 94 (explaining that the factory default settings of most routers 
and WAPs are set to operate in open mode). 
 29. Id. at 95, 107; see also EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 29 (concluding 
that no practical solutions currently exist to address this problem). 
 30. Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1278 (9th Cir. 2013); see EPIC 
Brief, supra note 15, at 12, 23 (stating that a device must be authenticated to 
send and receive communication over a Wi-Fi network). 
 31. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 23–24. 
 32. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees Benjamin Joffe, et al. at 16, Joffe v. 
Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-17483) [hereinafter Brief 
for Plaintiffs-Appellees]. Wi-Fi devices tend to have a range of 70 feet through 
300 feet, whereas an AM radio broadcast can cover up to 100 miles. EPIC 
Brief, supra note 15, at 17. 
 33. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 32; Packet Sniffing, INTERNET SECURITY 
SYS., http://www.iss.net/security_center/advice/Underground/Hacking/
Methods/Technical/Packet_sniffing/default.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
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transactions, and even credit card numbers.34 With the use of 
advanced technology, packet sniffers can capture, decode, and 
re-package fragmented Wi-Fi communications.35 
Furthermore, the increasingly popular use of geolocation 
technology to gather location data raises another concern.36 
Currently, MAC address mapping is the most commonly used 
method to gather location data, and involves a location provider 
(such as a Street View car) using a GPS device to detect MAC 
addresses of individually owned routers.37 The GPS device then 
measures a router’s signal strength and GPS coordinates.38 
MAC addresses for visible wireless routers are then submitted 
to a database, which returns the individual user’s location.39 
Smartphones regularly transmit the name, location, and signal 
strength of nearby networks to a company like Apple or Google, 
enabling the phone company to pinpoint a user’s location.40 
Additionally, many popular apps use and occasionally share 
location data absent the user’s knowledge or consent.41 A huge 
market for location-based services exists that is unlikely to 
disappear anytime soon.42 
                                                          
 34. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 32. Packet sniffers are becoming 
increasingly easy to install on routers, which is troublesome because the 
presence of sniffers are often very difficult to detect. Packet Sniffing, supra 
note 33. Programs such as Firesheep are available for free online and make it 
easy to see what other users on an unsecured network are doing. Kate 
Murphy, New Hacking Tools Pose Bigger Threats to Wi-Fi Users, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/technology/personaltech/
17basics.html. However, the technical expertise required to use packet 
sniffing programs is relatively uncommon. Potnuru, supra note 12, at 110–11. 
 35. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 24, 30–32 (explaining that sniffing 
programs tend to require sophisticated software and hardware to implement). 
 36. Gathering of location data with geolocation technology started with 
Skyhook’s “wardriving” program in 2003. See Julia Angwin & Jennifer 
Valentino-Devries, Apple, Google Collect User Data, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870398370457627
7101723453610. 
 37. Raymond Chow, Note, Why-Spy? An Analysis of Privacy and 
Geolocation in the Wake of the 2010 Google “Wi-Spy” Controversy, 39 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 56, 61 (2013). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 61–62. 
 40. Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 36. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. (stating that in 2010 a $2.9 billion market existed for location-
based services, with an expected increase to $8.3 billion by 2014). 
Furthermore, location-based features are some of the most popular features 
online. Peter Fleischer, Greater Choice for Wireless Access Point Owners, 
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B. STATUTORY PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR COMMUNICATIONS 
Statutory protections against the interception of 
communications are relatively recent developments in the 
United States. In 1968, Congress passed Title III of the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Wiretap 
Act) to create a private action for the interception of 
communications.43 The Wiretap Act, however, expressly limited 
protection to the “unauthorized aural interception” of wire or 
oral communications.44 
In order to update and clarify federal privacy protections to 
align with changes in communication technology, Congress 
passed the ECPA in 1986.45 In doing so, Congress sought to 
protect an individual’s privacy rights in computer-to-computer 
transmissions of data and e-mail.46 Another goal of Congress 
was to protect radio hobbyists from liability for innocently 
scanning frequencies of traditional radio broadcasts in order to 
reach public communications.47 
A number of ECPA subsections were particularly relevant 
in Joffe. Subsection 2511(1) assigns liability to “any person 
                                                          
GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Nov. 14, 2011, 2:00 AM), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/11/greater-choice-for-wireless-access.html. 
 43. Wiretap Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 223 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2012)). The Department of Justice notes that 
the Wiretap Act generally bars third parties from installing packet sniffers 
capable of reading Internet traffic. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV., 
COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, SEARCHING AND 
SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 167 (2009). 
 44. In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 
1067, 1077–78 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 45. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 
100 Stat. 1848; S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986) (“[T]he law must advance with 
the technology to ensure the continued vitality of the fourth amendment. 
Privacy cannot be left to depend solely on physical protection, or it will 
gradually erode as technology advances.”); see H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 16–19, 
31 (1986) (expressing worry about the gradual erosion of privacy rights and 
attempting, through the passage of the ECPA, to keep privacy protection of 
electronic communication consistent with Fourth Amendment expectations of 
privacy); see also In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating 
that the objective of the ECPA was to protect against the interception of 
electronic communication). 
 46. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2, 5 (suggesting that e-mail should receive 
similar privacy protections as regular mail); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 
22 (stating that individuals likely have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their e-mail communications). 
 47. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-541, at 4. 
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who: (a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept . . . any 
wire, oral, or electronic communication.”48 Importantly, two 
exceptions from Wiretap Act liability are provided by 
§ 2511(2)(g)(i) and (g)(ii).49 Subsection 2510(12) defines 
electronic communication as “any transfer of . . . data, or 
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by 
wire, [or] radio.”50 Subsection 2510(16) defines “‘readily 
accessible to the general public’ . . . with respect to a radio 
communication” as any communication that is not included in 
the five explicit exceptions provided by the statute.51 
In 1994, Congress passed the Communications Assistance 
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), which, under § 2510(16), 
added a new exception to the presumption of accessibility 
pertaining to electronic communications.52 The amendment 
sought to extend ECPA protection to new forms of wireless data 
communication.53 Despite Congress’ good intentions, the 
§ 2510(16) amendment led a rather short life. 
Congress amended the ECPA once again through the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA).54 While primarily focused on habeas corpus reform 
and anti-terrorism efforts, the AEDPA removed the § 2510(16) 
explicit exception to the presumption of accessibility for 
electronic communications added by the CALEA two years 
                                                          
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012). 
 49. It is not unlawful for any person: “(i) to intercept . . . an electronic 
communication made through an electronic communication system that is 
configured so that such electronic communication is readily accessible to the 
general public.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i). Additionally, it is not unlawful for 
any person: “(ii) to intercept any radio communication which is 
transmitted . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii) (providing four explicit 
circumstances where it is lawful to intercept radio communication). 
 50. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012). 
 51. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16); see In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns 
Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1079–80 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that § 2510(16) 
raises a presumption of accessibility and enumerates five specific exceptions 
for what is not considered readily accessible). 
 52. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), Pub. 
L. No. 103-414, § 203, 108 Stat. 4279, 4291 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(16)). 
 53. See H.R. REP. No. 103-827, pt. 1, at 14 (1994) (recommending the 
extension of ECPA protection to cover new forms of wireless data 
communication); see also S. REP. No. 103-402, at 32 (1994) (discussing the 
rationale for the ECPA amendment). 
 54. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. 
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1303. 
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prior.55 Legislative history suggests Congress believed 
electronic communications were adequately protected prior to 
the passage of the CALEA; the CALEA amendment only 
intended to make it abundantly clear that electronic 
communications were protected under the ECPA.56 Aside from 
the protection provided by the ECPA, CALEA, and AEDPA, 
federal privacy law remains relatively unchanged since the 
passage of the Wiretap Act over forty years ago.57 
C. FTC AND FCC GOOGLE INVESTIGATIONS 
The FTC became the first U.S. agency to conduct an 
investigation, albeit short lived, addressing Google’s collection 
of payload data.58 The FTC informed Google that it would be 
dropping its investigation just days after Google publicly 
admitted it had collected non-fragmented payload data.59 David 
Vladeck, then-director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection (a 
division of the FTC), dropped the investigation on account of 
the actions Google took in the wake of the Street View 
incident.60 For example, Google implemented a new “opt-out” 
policy through which a user may change their SSID to end with 
the designation “_nomap” to prevent data from being 
collected.61 Encouragingly, the FTC has since called on 
                                                          
 55. Id. It remains unclear what exactly Congress intended to accomplish 
by removing the § 2510(16) amendment provided by the CALEA. See Joffe v. 
Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 56. See H.R. REP. No. 104-518, at 80, 93 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 57. Lindsey A. Strachan, Re-mapping Privacy Law: How the Google Maps 
Scandal Requires Tort Law Reform, RICH. J.L. & TECH., 1, 10 (Spring 2011), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v17i4/article14.pdf. 
 58. Gruenwald, supra note 7. 
 59. Id. A number of privacy advocate organizations, including the EPIC 
and the Center for Digital Democracy, criticized the FTC’s decision to drop the 
probe and even questioned the “influence Google has over the Obama 
administration.” Id. 
 60. Such actions included appointing a new director of privacy 
management, implementing privacy training for “key employees,” 
incorporating a privacy review process, and pledging to delete the collected 
payload data as soon as possible. Id. 
 61. Chow, supra note 37, at 73–74; Fleisher, supra note 42; see also 
Wayne Rash, Google’s WiFi Opt-Out Process Makes Users Navigate Technical 
Maze, EWEEK.COM (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Mobile-and-
Wireless/Googles-WiFi-Optout-Process-Makes-Users-Navigate-Technical-
Maze-696453/ (discussing the difficulties most people would face with 
implementing the opt-out policy, the failure of the policy to protect users’ 
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Congress to implement tougher consumer privacy rules—
particularly legislation that would regulate data brokers who 
compile and sell a range of personal and financial data.62 
On November 3, 2010, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) sent an initial letter of inquiry requesting 
information on how Google collected the payload data, what 
Google collected, and whether any data had been examined or 
used.63 Google provided minimal information, and admitted to 
not making a comprehensive review of the FCC request, stating 
it would be “time consuming” and “burdensome.”64 Overall, the 
investigation did not run smoothly. Google hindered and 
delayed the FCC’s investigation by failing to respond to 
requests for material information and through repeated 
failures to provide an affidavit stating Google’s responses were 
truthful and complete.65 
In the end, the FCC found that not only did a Google 
software engineer deliberately write the code used in the Street 
View cars with the intention to collect payload data,66 but 
evidence suggested that as early as 2007 or 2008, numerous 
members of Google’s Street View team had access to the code.67 
                                                          
rights, and the benefits of implementing an opt-in policy as opposed to the 
selected opt-out policy). 
 62. See Tanzina Vega & Edward Wyatt, U.S. Agency Seeks Tougher 
Consumer Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/03/27/business/ftc-seeks-privacy-legislation.html?pagewanted=all 
(presenting the FTC’s concerns about the high volume of data being collected 
and how little control consumers have over that data, and the FTC’s position 
that consumers should have access to information collected about them in 
addition to having the ability to correct and update that information). 
 63. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4018–19. 
 64. Id. at 4020. Google did admit, however, that employees on the Street 
View team had actually reviewed the payload data on two occasions. Id. 
 65. Id. at 4013 (finding that Google willfully and repeatedly violated FCC 
orders throughout the investigation). 
 66. Id. at 4021. The engineer wrote the code with the intention to collect, 
store, and analyze the payload data offline for use in location-based services 
and potentially other Google initiatives. Id. at 4021–22. Ultimately, over 600 
gigabytes of data (including 200 gigabytes of payload data, some of which was 
personally identifiable) were collected and stored on servers at Google’s data 
center. See Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 67. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4028. For example, the code design 
document cited privacy considerations that were never discussed. Google Inc., 
FCC No. DA 12-592, File No. EB-10-IH-4055, at 11 (Apr. 13, 2012). In 
addition, based on e-mails from 2006 collected by the FCC during the 
investigation, the design engineer made the Street View team (including a 
senior manager) aware that payload data would be collected. Id. at 14–15. 
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Additionally, the FCC investigation exposed a lack of 
supervision over the collected Wi-Fi data and a general 
disregard of privacy considerations.68 
The FCC investigation determined that Google’s code 
utilized a packet sniffer to capture, separate, and store the 
MAC address and SSID of individual WAPs.69 The sniffer 
would then search for “encryption flags,” and either discard 
data from encrypted networks or capture all wireless frame and 
payload data from unencrypted networks.70 Ultimately, 
Google’s source code discarded data sent over encrypted 
networks, but not the data transmitted over open networks.71 
D. CURRENT ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 
When discussing online privacy protections it is important 
to note that the primary statutory framework in the United 
States, the ECPA, became law prior to the Internet era.72 As a 
result, courts and scholars alike argue that the existing federal 
framework is poorly suited to address modern forms of 
communication.73 Without change, privacy protection of 
Internet and electronic communications will likely remain 
“confusing and uncertain.”74 New communications technology 
                                                          
Moreover, another Street View engineer allegedly conducted a “line-by-line” 
review of the Wi-Fi project in 2007, and claimed he did not realize the code 
would collect payload data. Id. at 17. Despite the fact that members of the 
Street View team clearly should have been aware that they were collecting 
payload data, those who worked on the Street View project “uniformly” 
asserted they did not know about the data collection until April or May of 
2010. Id. at 17. 
 68. See FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 4027, 4033 (finding that the privacy 
considerations listed in the design document were never reviewed by counsel, 
nor by other Street View employees, and that a Street View senior manager 
pre-approved the code before it was written). 
 69. Id. at 4016–17. 
 70. The packet sniffer would search for encryption flags; if the sniffer 
determined the frame was encrypted, the data was cleared, and if the frame 
were unencrypted the payload data would be written onto a memory disk. See 
id. at 4016–17. 
 71. Id. at 4017. 
 72. E.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 73. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he existing statutory framework is ill-suited to 
address modern forms of communication like . . . [a] secure website.”). 
 74. Id.; see Matthew Beirlein, Note, Policing the Wireless World: Access 
Liability in the Open Wi-Fi Era, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1123, 1126 (2006) (arguing 
that inconsistent legal responses to the treatment of open wireless networks 
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undoubtedly leads to new privacy problems, yet privacy 
protections failed to keep pace.75 The failure of protections to 
keep pace with technological developments are especially 
disconcerting, given the fact that privacy harms might be worse 
now than ever before.76 
Although the legislative history shows Congress passed the 
ECPA in order to protect electronic communications from 
interception, with a particular concern for e-mail 
communications,77 courts cannot agree on how to protect online 
privacy. For example, some courts have found that users enjoy 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications,78 
while others have placed considerable limitations on the 
protection of such communication.79 Additionally, courts 
                                                          
will create confusion among users and may ultimately hamper technological 
development). 
 75. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 
483, 564 (2006) (explaining that privacy problems are much different today 
than yesterday, in that online privacy threats generally do not involve 
physical intrusion); see also City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 758–61 
(2010) (explaining that new technology inherently means that certain modes 
of communication will be used more than others, which increases the need to 
recognize privacy rights in such forms of communication); United States v. 
Ahrndt, No. 10-30281, 2010 WL 373994, at *6 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010), rev’d, 475 
F. App’x 656 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that the extent to which the Fourth 
Amendment protects electronic communications is unresolved); Patricia 
Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One’s Own: On Privacy and Online Social 
Networks, 6 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 76–77 (2007) (discussing the 
gap between young peoples’ expectations of privacy on the internet (selective 
anonymity) and those of older generations (control-centered expectation that 
resulted from living in an era where one had greater control over personal 
information)); Strachan, supra note 57, at 6 (describing a general disconnect 
between views of privacy then and now). 
 76. Reputational harms are more permanent and tangible than ever. See 
Sanchez Abril, supra note 75, at 75 (citing the permanence, searchability, 
replicability, and transformability of personal information data, and the 
“multitude of often unintended audiences” with access to such data). 
 77. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2, 8 (1986) (describing new technological 
developments at the time and defining “electronic mail”). 
 78. See, e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails); United States v. 
Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d 701, 703 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding a violation of the 
Wiretap Act when an employee configured a supervisor’s e-mail to be sent to 
himself); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that a user has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the underlying content 
of e-mails). 
 79. See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
e-mail content no longer remains private once received, thus losing any 
reasonable expectation of privacy a user might have had); see also Allyson W. 
2014] ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION 1167 
 
disagree as to whether communication over Wi-Fi networks is 
exempt from Wiretap Act protection.80 Courts also disagree 
about the existence of privacy protections for users of online 
social networks (OSNs).81 
It is difficult to discern any particular trend in online 
privacy case law, but the weight of authority seems to suggest 
that whether a reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet 
communications exists depends on an individual’s utilization of 
privacy-ensuring measures.82 Non-content data such as a WAP, 
MAC address, IP address, and SSID, are not typically 
considered to have an accompanying reasonable expectation of 
privacy.83 The distinction between individual users’ 
                                                          
Haynes, Virtual Blinds: Finding Online Privacy in Offline Precedents, 14 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 603, 631–32, 638 (2012) (discussing the limited 
privacy protections granted to e-mail communications, and the majority view 
that e-mail content no longer remains private once received on account of the 
third-party doctrine). 
 80. Compare Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that Wi-Fi communications do not constitute an “electronic 
communication . . . readily accessible to the general public”), and In re Google 
Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (holding that Wi-Fi communications are not radio communications, and 
thus not exempt under the ECPA’s G1 exception), with United States v. 
Ahrndt, No. 10-30281, 2010 WL 373994, at *5–6 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010), rev’d, 
475 F. App’x 656 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that unencrypted Wi-Fi networks are 
readily accessible to the general public, and that a diminished expectation of 
privacy exists for data transferred over unsecure networks), and In re 
Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 886 F. Supp. 2d 888, 893–94 (N.D. 
Ill. 2012) (holding that communication sent over an unencrypted Wi-Fi 
network is considered readily accessible to the general public and excluded 
from Wiretap Act protection). 
 81. Compare Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that privacy protections for posts on social networks 
depend upon the use of privacy controls), with Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907 
N.Y.S.2d 650, 652–57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (holding that no expectation of 
privacy exists on an OSN, regardless of one’s efforts to utilize privacy 
controls). 
 82. Haynes, supra note 79, at 638; see, e.g., United States v. Ganoe, 538 
F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a user’s expectation of privacy in 
the information contained on one’s computer can be diminished by one’s 
conduct and use of the computer); Ahrndt, 2010 WL 373994, at *6 (stating 
that society recognizes a lower expectation of privacy when using an 
unsecured network). But see United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) 
(concluding that the transmission of electronic signals remain subject to the 
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test). 
 83. See Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510 (holding that no reasonable expectation 
of privacy exists in non-content and addressing information); Johnson v. 
1168 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
 
expectations regarding the access and use of Wi-Fi networks 
and their expectations that private data sent over such 
networks will remain private creates an additional 
complication.84 Generally, users lack awareness of the privacy 
risks involved when communicating over Wi-Fi networks 
(encrypted or unencrypted),85 and yet expect that such 
communications will remain private. 
E. OFFLINE PRIVACY PRINCIPLES 
The right to privacy developed and found its roots in the 
Fourth Amendment.86 Since then, two influential articles have 
single-handedly shaped the development of privacy law.87 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis tend to be considered the 
founders of privacy law.88 Warren and Brandeis described the 
individual89 right to privacy as the “right to be let alone,”90 
which built on similar rights in other legal areas.91 Following 
the publication of Warren and Brandeis’s article, privacy tort 
law experienced significant growth and experimentation.92 
During this time period, judicial analysis of privacy actions 
focused on whether the resulting harm fell under the principle 
of the right to be let alone.93 
Over eighty years after Warren and Brandeis, Professor 
William Prosser wrote an article establishing the principles of 
                                                          
Microsoft Corp., No. C06-0900RAJ, 2009 WL 1794400, at *4 (W.D. Wash. June 
23, 2009) (“[A]n IP address is not personally identifiable . . . .”). 
 84. Potnuru, supra note 12, at 104. 
 85. See id. at 105. 
 86. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 87. See Strachan, supra note 57, at 9–10. 
 88. See id. at 9. 
 89. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960); 
Strachan, supra note 57, at 9 (explaining that Warren and Brandeis wanted to 
prevent the affairs of private individuals from being exposed to “undesirable 
publicity”). Warren and Brandeis believed that the resulting harm from 
privacy violations was primarily mental and emotional. See Neil M. Richards 
& Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
1887, 1916 (2010). 
 90. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 193, 198 (1890) (arguing that each individual has the right 
to determine to what extent his thoughts will be communicated to others). 
 91. See Strachan, supra note 57, at 9–10. 
 92. Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1922, 1924 (explaining that 
privacy tort law experienced a period of dynamism pre-Prosser). 
 93. Id. at 1915. 
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privacy law still in effect today.94 In his article, Prosser 
delineated four privacy torts—each designed to protect a 
different aspect of privacy.95 The four torts seek to protect 
against (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) public disclosure of 
private facts; (3) publicity that places an individual in false 
light in the public eye; and (4) the appropriation of one’s name 
or likeness.96 Prosser expressed concern that privacy law may 
expand and invade upon other distinct legal fields, and as a 
result, sought to steer it toward a limited and cautious path.97 
Stemming from Prosser’s caution, scholars have begun to 
question the effectiveness of current privacy tort law.98 Some 
scholars argue that Prosser made privacy tort law static and 
limited its ability to grow and adapt to privacy concerns 
relevant in today’s society.99 As a result, scholars increasingly 
believe that Prosser’s four torts provide little guidance on how 
to shape future developments.100 
The realm of privacy law is certainly more complex than 
Prosser’s four torts.101 The lack of changes in privacy tort law 
since Prosser, however, has left the tort system ill-equipped to 
address modern privacy claims such as those raised in Joffe.102 
It does not help matters that courts tend to be dismissive and 
skeptical of electronic communication privacy harms.103 
Moreover, the narrow and traditional judicial conception of 
privacy as a binary, all or nothing approach is no longer 
                                                          
 94. Strachan, supra note 57, at 10; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 652A-I (1977) (codifying Prosser’s four privacy torts). Nearly every state 
recognizes at least one form of privacy tort by statute or common law. 
Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1917. 
 95. Prosser, supra note 89, at 389 (viewing the four torts as four distinct 
invasions of four different interests, unrelated to one another with almost 
nothing in common); Strachan, supra note 57, at 10. Prosser’s methodology 
involved analyzing and restating the holdings of many privacy-related cases. 
Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1912. 
 96. Prosser, supra note 89, at 389. 
 97. See Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1887, 1906, 1915 (arguing 
that Prosser refused to allow privacy to mean more than his four torts). 
 98. E.g., id. at 1889 (stating that most scholars believe privacy tort law 
has largely been ineffective). 
 99. Id. at 1887, 1922. 
 100. Id. at 1890. 
 101. Solove, supra note 75, at 483. 
 102. E.g., Strachan, supra note 57, at 8. 
 103. See Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1922 (reasoning that the 
court’s skepticism stems from the usual lack of a physical component). 
1170 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
 
sensible.104 Regardless of the limitations faced by privacy tort 
law, and that private party conduct on its own fails to implicate 
Fourth Amendment principles,105 this Comment argues that 
offline privacy principles can and should be applied to online 
privacy claims.106 
II. JOFFE V. GOOGLE, INC.: CLASSIFYING PAYLOAD 
DATA TRANSMITTED OVER UNENCRYPTED WI-FI 
NETWORKS UNDER THE WIRETAP ACT 
On November 8, 2010, Benjamin Joffe filed a class action 
suit against Google alleging that the interception of payload 
data from unencrypted Wi-Fi networks was in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(1) of the Wiretap Act.107 The district court faced 
a “novel question of statutory interpretation” as to the 
applicability of the § 2510(16) definition of “readily accessible” 
to the G1 exception (an express exemption to Wiretap Act 
protection),108 and how to properly define “radio 
communication” under the Wiretap Act.109 Ultimately, the 
district court denied Google’s motion to dismiss.110 Through an 
examination of the statute’s text and legislative history, the 
                                                          
 104. See id. at 1920 (arguing for the need to move away from the public-
private dichotomy since information is rarely, if ever, completely one or the 
other). 
 105. United States v. Young, 153 F.3d 1079, 1080 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 106. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117, 122, 125 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 351–54, 361 (1967) (establishing the test for what constitutes a 
reasonable expectation of privacy); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
465–66 (1928); Byars v. United States 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927); Ostergren v. 
Cuccinellie, 615 F.3d 263, 290 (4th Cir. 2010); Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n 
v. FCC, 567 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Young, 153 F.3d at 1080; Sanders v. 
Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 71–72 (Cal. 1999); Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970). 
 107. In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 
1067, 1072–74 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 
 108. “G1” refers to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2012), stating that “[i]t shall 
not be unlawful under this chapter . . . for any person . . . to intercept or access 
an electronic communication made through an electronic communication 
system that is configured so that such electronic communication is readily 
accessible to the general public.” 
 109. In re Google, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1074, 1080 (noting that Congress 
failed to define “radio communication” in the Act and also declined to explain 
the applicability of § 2510(16) to the G1 exception). 
 110. Id. at 1084. 
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district court held that § 2510(16) applies to G1,111 “radio 
communication” does not include data transmitted over a Wi-Fi 
network,112 and that Wi-Fi data sent over an unencrypted 
network is not “readily accessible to the general public.”113 
Following the district court’s judgment, Google sought and 
received an interlocutory appeal.114 The Joffe court inherited 
the task of resolving three primary issues of statutory 
interpretation: (1) whether the § 2510(16) definition of “readily 
accessible to the general public” applies to G1; (2) whether 
payload data sent over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is 
considered to be a radio communication; and (3) whether such 
Wi-Fi communications are “readily accessible to the general 
public” (under the ordinary meaning of the phrase).115 The Joffe 
court became the first circuit to rule on the aforementioned 
issues, which gave the court an opportunity to provide much 
needed clarification as to the level of statutory privacy 
protection afforded to modern, electronic communications.116 It 
remains to be seen whether Joffe will be used as a catalyst to 
provide a necessary update to privacy protections for modern 
forms of communication, or plunge the already muddled and 
outdated state of online privacy protection into further 
disarray. 
A. “RADIO COMMUNICATION” DOES NOT INCLUDE PAYLOAD 
DATA SENT OVER WI-FI NETWORKS 
Google once more urged the court to broadly define “radio 
communication” as “any information transmitted using radio 
waves.”117 Since the Wiretap Act does not define “radio 
                                                          
 111. In addition, the court held that Congress did not intend the § 2510(16) 
definition of “readily accessible” to apply to electronic communication not 
classified as a “traditional radio service.” See id. at 1081 (excluding the 
applicability of § 2510(16)’s definition to Wi-Fi communication). 
 112. The court defined radio communication as “traditional radio services 
or broadcast radio.” Id. at 1083 (rejecting Google’s proposed technical 
definition of “all communications transmitted over radio waves”). 
 113. Id. at 1083. 
 114. Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 115. Id. at 1267. 
 116. See Hanni Fakhoury, What the Google Street View Decision Means for 
Researchers (and Cops), ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 16, 2013), 
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/what-google-street-view-decision-means-
researchers-and-cops. 
 117. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1268. 
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communication,” the court assigned the term its ordinary 
meaning.118 After determining that Google’s proposed definition 
does not conform to the common understanding of “radio 
communication,”119 the court rejected Google’s definition.120 The 
court reasoned that since Congress provided technical 
definitions for similar terms in the Wiretap Act, but did not for 
“radio communication,” Congress intended the phrase to be 
given its ordinary meaning.121 
As a result, the Joffe court defined “radio communication” 
as a “predominantly auditory broadcast,” thus excluding 
payload data sent over unencrypted Wi-Fi networks.122 The 
court concluded that defining “radio communication” as a 
“predominantly auditory broadcast” ensured consistency with 
the rest of the Wiretap Act.123 The court reasoned that the 
different usage of the terms “radio communication” and 
“communication by radio” throughout the Wiretap Act,124 the 
manner in which “radio communication” is used in G2 (an 
express exemption to Wiretap Act protection),125 the avoidance 
                                                          
 118. Id. 
 119. In common, everyday use, neither watching television nor sending an 
e-mail over a Wi-Fi network is considered to be a radio communication. See id. 
at 1268–69 (reasoning that under Google’s interpretation, a TV broadcast 
would fall under the umbrella of “radio communication” and that one would 
not consider TV to be a type of “radio communication”). 
 120. The court reasoned that the Wiretap Act does not assume that “radio 
communication” includes technology outside of the scope of the phrase’s 
ordinary definition. Id. at 1269. For example, the Wiretap Act’s damages 
provision provides separate penalties for intercepting satellite video 
communications and radio communications. See id. (pointing out that satellite 
television communications are described separately from radio 
communications, despite both transmitting over radio frequencies). 
 121. Id. 
 122. The payload data captured by Google included “emails, usernames, 
passwords, images, and documents,” none of which can be classified as 
“predominantly auditory.” Id. at 1270. 
 123. Id. at 1270. 
 124. The court reasoned that the phrase “communication by radio” is used 
more expansively throughout the Wiretap Act, encompassing all 
communication using radio waves. Id. Throughout the Wiretap Act, words 
that evoke traditional radio technology surround the phrase “radio 
communication,” lending support to the ruling that “radio communication” 
refers narrowly to traditional broadcast radio technology. Id. at 1271. 
 125. “G2” refers to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(ii) (2012), which states: “It shall 
not be unlawful under this chapter . . . for any person . . . to intercept any 
radio communication which is transmitted . . . by any station for the use of the 
general public . . . .” While the G2 exception is not at issue in Joffe, the court 
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of absurd results inconsistent with the Wiretap Act,126 and the 
inapplicability of the Communication Act’s definition of “radio 
communication”127 all support defining “radio communication” 
as a “predominantly auditory broadcast.” 
In arguing for a broad definition of “radio communication,” 
Google heavily relied on two amendments that altered 
§ 2510(16).128 In 1994, Congress adopted § 2510(16)(F), which 
provided that with respect to a radio communication, electronic 
communications are not “readily accessible to the general 
public.”129 Two years later, however, Congress repealed 
§ 2510(16)(F).130 Google argued that by repealing § 2510(16)(F), 
Congress eliminated the only protection for unencrypted data 
sent over a Wi-Fi network.131 The Joffe court rejected Google’s 
interpretation, holding that nothing indicates what Congress 
intended by repealing § 2510(16)(F), and instead elected to 
follow the ordinary meaning of “radio communication.”132 
                                                          
reasoned that under Google’s definition it would not make sense to identify 
certain types of “radio communication” (that have little in common with Wi-Fi 
technology) to be exempt under G2 only to exempt broad, dissimilar 
communications (such as payload data transmitted over a Wi-Fi network) in 
G1. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1271. Rather, it makes more sense to read the general 
G1 exemption in light of the specific exemptions in G2. Id. at 1272. 
 126. For example, if Google’s broad definition were appropriate, protection 
for online communications under the Wiretap Act would turn on “whether the 
recipient of those communications” secured his or her Wi-Fi network. Joffe, 
729 F.3d at 1272. Given that the primary purpose of the Wiretap Act is to 
effectively protect the privacy of communications, the court reasoned that 
Congress clearly did not intend to permit “such an intrusive and unwarranted 
invasion of privacy.” Id. 
 127. The Communication Act broadly defines the phrase “radio 
communication.” Id. at 1274. Congress expressly stated, however, when it 
wanted to apply a definition from the Communication Act to the Wiretap Act, 
and did not do so with respect to “radio communication.” Id. Additionally, 
unlike the Wiretap Act, the phrases “radio communication” and 
“communication by radio” are used synonymously throughout the 
Communication Act. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1274–75; see AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996); CALEA, Pub. L. No. 103-414, § 203, 108 Stat. 4279, 4291 (1994) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2510(16) (2012)). 
 129. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1275. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Essentially, Google interpreted the amendments as standing for the 
notion that both before 1994 and after 1996, payload data sent over Wi-Fi 
networks are considered to be a “radio communication” which is “readily 
accessible to the general public.” See id. at 1276. 
 132. Id. The court reasoned that the decision to add § 2510(16)(F) does not 
show that Congress believed data sent over a Wi-Fi network to be a “radio 
1174 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
 
B. THE § 2510(16) DEFINITION OF READILY ACCESSIBLE 
APPLIES TO G1 
For two primary reasons, the court in Joffe agreed with 
Google and held that the definition of “readily accessible” in 
§ 2510(16) applies to G1.133 First, the Wiretap Act treats “radio 
communication” as a subset of “electronic communication.”134 
Second, the Wiretap Act expressly provides that the definitions 
established in § 2510 apply to the entire chapter.135 While the 
Joffe court could not disregard the statutory directive to apply 
§ 2510(16) to G1, the court did hold that the § 2510(16) “readily 
accessible” definition only applies to G1 when the electronic 
communication at issue is also a “radio communication.”136 
Therefore, because the court determined that Wi-Fi data sent 
over an unencrypted network is not considered a “radio 
communication,” the § 2510(16) definition of “readily 
accessible” does not apply here.137 
C. WI-FI COMMUNICATIONS ARE NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE TO 
THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
After determining that payload data sent over an 
unencrypted Wi-Fi network is not a “radio communication” 
under the Wiretap Act, thus rendering § 2510(16) inapplicable, 
the Joffe court considered whether such transmissions are 
“readily accessible” under the ordinary meaning of the 
phrase.138 After a short analysis, the court held that because 
                                                          
communication.” Id. Additionally, no legislative history explains why Congress 
decided to repeal § 2510(16)(F). Id. The court then provided two plausible 
rationales, neither of which were consistent with Google’s interpretation, to 
explain the decision to repeal § 2510(16)(F): (1) to eliminate redundancy; and 
(2) to eliminate the incoherence created by § 2510(16)(F). Id. (reasoning that 
§ 2510(16)(F) made it seem as though electronic communications are a subset 
of radio communications, despite the fact that the Wiretap Act treats the 
latter as a subset of the former). 
 133. Id. at 1267. 
 134. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012) (defining electronic communication 
as “any transfer of data . . . transmitted in whole or in part by . . . radio” 
(emphasis added)). 
 135. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1267; see 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (prefacing with the 
phrase “[a]s used in this chapter”). 
 136. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1266. 
 137. Id. at 1268. 
 138. The court determined that although the transmissions at issue fall 
outside of § 2510(16), such a transmission may still be considered “readily 
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payload data sent over Wi-Fi networks are not “readily 
accessible to the general public,” Google may not escape 
liability through the use of G1.139 
First, the court reasoned that unlike traditional radio 
broadcasts, Wi-Fi transmissions are significantly limited 
geographically.140 Wi-Fi broadcasts are limited to a peak output 
of one watt, whereas other traditional radio broadcasts range 
from 250 to 100,000 watts.141 Wi-Fi broadcasts often do not 
travel far beyond one’s home or office, and tend to have a 
service range of less than 330 feet.142 By contrast, an AM radio 
broadcast boasts a service range of up to 100 miles.143 
Second, the court found that payload data transmitted over 
an unencrypted Wi-Fi network is difficult to intercept and 
access.144 As opposed to traditional radio broadcasts, a wireless 
device must be authenticated before it may communicate with 
a WAP.145 Additionally, Wi-Fi communications are encoded 
even if sent over an unencrypted network, and are sent only to 
a specific destination.146 This method of communication makes 
intercepting and decoding data extremely difficult without 
sophisticated hardware and software.147 Most of the general 
public lacks the technical expertise to intercept and decode 
such data.148 As a result, the Joffe court affirmed the district 
court’s decision.149 
                                                          
accessible to the general public” and exempt from liability under G1. Id. at 
1277. 
 139. Id. But see United States v. Ahrndt, No. 10-30281, 2010 WL 373994, 
at *5 (D. Or. Jan. 28, 2010), rev’d, 475 F. App’x 656 (9th Cir. 2012) (“I conclude 
that society recognizes a lower expectation of privacy in information broadcast 
via an unsecured wireless network . . . .”). 
 140. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1277. 
 141. Id. at 1278. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. In order to intercept and decode payload data transmitted over a 
Wi-Fi network, a wireless device (generally a packet sniffer) must connect 
with the Wi-Fi network and proceed to send encapsulated and coded data to a 
specified destination (in Google’s case, to the Street View cars and eventually 
their data storage facility). Id. 
 148. Id. Even if members of the general public commonly connect to a 
neighbor’s unsecured Wi-Fi network, such individuals usually do not 
mistakenly intercept, store, and decode payload data. Id. at 1279. 
 149. Id. at 1278–79. 
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III. GETTING DOWN TO BRASS TACKS: ANALYZING THE 
SHORTCOMINGS OF JOFFE, THE RESULTING POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS, AND A PROPOSAL TO EFFECTIVELY 
PROTECT THE PRIVACY OF ONLINE COMMUNICATION 
Considering that the issues presented to the Joffe court 
were primarily matters of statutory interpretation,150 the court 
did a good job of resolving the issues in front of them. The court 
did fail, however, to take advantage of an opportunity to 
provide clarification and guidance as to what types of electronic 
communications are actually protected under the Wiretap Act. 
Additionally, unlike what we have seen in a number of other 
courts,151 the Joffe court did not make use of Fourth 
Amendment privacy principles to address modern forms of 
electronic communication.152 Perhaps the most glaring 
shortcoming of the Joffe decision, however, was the court’s 
scant analysis of what “readily accessible to the general public” 
means in ordinary terms under the G1 exemption. 
The Joffe decision failed to address a number of gaps in our 
current privacy protection framework relating to modern 
electronic communication technologies. As a result, the Wiretap 
Act continues to provide uncertain and inadequate privacy 
protection for modern electronic communications. On account of 
the court’s failure to address the disconnect between Wi-Fi 
users’ understanding of Wi-Fi technology and their 
expectations of privacy when using such technology, the gap 
between expectations and legal reality will likely continue to 
worsen. Furthermore, due to the increasing use of cell phones 
to collect location data153 and the ever-growing market for 
                                                          
 150. See, e.g., id. at 1270 (“Throughout the Wiretap Act, Congress used the 
phrase ‘radio communication’ . . . . [T]he phrase ‘radio communication’ tends to 
refer more narrowly to broadcast radio technologies rather than to the radio 
waves by which the communication is made.”). 
 151. See supra Part I.D. 
 152. Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1275–77. 
 153. See Ellen Nakashima, Agencies Collected Data on Americans’ 
Cellphone Use in Thousands of Tower Dumps, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/agencies-collected-
data-on-americans-cellphone-use-in-thousands-of-tower-dumps/2013/12/08/
20549190-5e80-11e3-be07-006c776266ed_story.html (“Federal, state and local 
law enforcement agencies conducting criminal investigations collected data on 
cellphone activity thousands of times last year . . . . Data linked to specific cell 
towers can be used to track people’s movements.”). 
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location-based services,154 electronic communication privacy 
protections (or, more appropriately, lack thereof) may very well 
be headed down a slippery slope.155 
Recognizing the fact that the Joffe court’s ability to 
effectuate change was rather limited on account of the nature 
of the case itself (exclusively resolving questions of statutory 
interpretation), the holdings that Wi-Fi communications are 
not considered to be a “radio communication” nor “readily 
accessible to the general public” were a step in the right 
direction. 
Congress should use Joffe as a springboard to update the 
Wiretap Act to expressly protect unencrypted Wi-Fi 
transmissions in order to bring the reality of Wi-Fi users’ 
knowledge and reasonable expectations of privacy in line with 
the law. By establishing a distinction between content and non-
content data, imposing new requirements on device 
manufacturers, and applying offline Fourth Amendment 
principles to the online world, Congress would be able to 
provide effective privacy protections for modern electronic 
communications. It is time to acknowledge and address the fact 
that modern communication technologies have rapidly 
outpaced statutory and judicial privacy protections. 
A. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF JOFFE 
1.  What Joffe Got Right 
An important element of the Joffe decision that went 
relatively unnoticed was the court’s willingness to view online 
privacy as something more than a binary, all or nothing 
concept.156 Had the court adopted a binary approach, one likely 
result may have been that encrypted Wi-Fi networks would be 
considered protected under the Wiretap Act, while unencrypted 
                                                          
 154. See SYNIVERSE, LOCATING AN OPPORTUNITY: THE RISE OF CELLULAR 
NETWORKS AS A METHOD FOR LOCATION-BASED SERVICES 2 (2013), available 
at http://www.syniverse.com/files/Rise_of_Cellular_Networks_as_LBS.pdf 
(“Although location-based services have been available for nearly ten years, 
their usage has only started to grow significantly in the last few years.”). 
 155. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 156. Cf. Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1891, 1922 (emphasizing the 
necessity of rethinking outdated understandings of privacy by abandoning a 
binary, all or nothing approach, and arguing that courts must change their 
approach to privacy protections in order to effectuate this change in 
understanding). 
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Wi-Fi networks would be considered “readily accessible to the 
general public.” This type of binary approach would have led to 
the absurd results the Joffe court worked to avoid.157 The Joffe 
court once more rejected the binary approach in holding that 
the applicability of G1 does not turn on whether the Wi-Fi 
network itself is accessible (unencrypted/encrypted distinction), 
but instead on whether the communication itself is readily 
accessible.158 Privacy advocates point out that the Joffe court’s 
rejection of the binary approach provides a strong rationale 
that law enforcement must now, at least in the Ninth Circuit, 
obtain a wiretap order or warrant to access an individual’s Wi-
Fi communications.159 
It is hard to argue against the court’s conclusion that the 
§ 2510(16) “readily accessible” definition applies to G1 to the 
extent that such communication involved is not only electronic, 
but also radio.160 After all, the statute provides specific 
instructions to apply the definitions found in § 2510 to the 
chapter’s entirety.161 
Furthermore, the Joffe court appropriately held that the 
Wi-Fi communications at issue are not a type of “radio 
communication” under the Wiretap Act.162 By using the 
ordinary, non-technical definition of “radio communication,” the 
court limited the reach of the § 2510(16) presumption that 
radio communications are “readily accessible to the general 
public.”163 After determining that “radio communications” are 
“predominantly auditory broadcasts,” the court logically 
concluded that § 2510(16) did not apply to G1 in this instance 
since Wi-Fi transmissions are not considered to be “radio 
communications.”164 While it is quite clear that Wi-Fi differs 
                                                          
 157. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 158. Joffe v. Google, Inc., 729 F.3d 1262, 1275–77 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 159. Fakhoury, supra note 116. 
 160. See Joffe, 729 F.3d at 1265–66 (rejecting Joffe’s interpretation that 
§ 2510(16) applies exclusively to G2); see also Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
supra note 32, at 38 (arguing that since “readily accessible” is not defined with 
respect to electronic communications, as it is with respect to radio 
communications, the ordinary meaning should be used in G1). 
 161. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra Part II.A. 
 163. See In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 
2d 1067, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (describing the “presumption of accessibility” 
established by Congress in § 2510(16)). 
 164. See supra Part II.B. 
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from traditional radio broadcast services, the Joffe court failed 
to espouse a general principle to guide the legislature and other 
courts, who may now face the task of classifying a different 
form of modern communication technology as radio or non-
radio. 
2. Inadequate Analysis of the G1 Exemption 
In stark contrast to the court’s thorough analysis of 
whether payload data transmitted over an unsecured Wi-Fi 
network is properly classified as a “radio communication,” the 
court glossed over what “readily accessible” means in ordinary 
terms under G1. The court determined that on account of the 
geographically limited range of Wi-Fi networks and the 
apparent difficulty of intercepting and decoding Wi-Fi 
transmissions, such transmissions are not “readily accessible to 
the general public” under G1.165 
By limiting the holding to Wi-Fi transmissions, the court 
missed an opportunity to provide clarification and guidance as 
to when certain communications are considered “readily 
accessible” in ordinary terms, thus excluding their interception 
from liability under G1. Arguably, the language used in G1 
suggests that what matters is the intended purpose behind the 
designs of certain communication technology, as opposed to 
whether such technology might be able to be used contrary to 
the designer’s intention.166 Simply put, whether something is 
considered “readily accessible” under G1 should depend on 
whether the technology itself is designed to make 
communications readily available to the public, and not 
whether an individual could engage in wiretapping “as a 
matter of cost and practicality.”167 If the focus lies anywhere 
else other than on the design of the communication technology 
and its intended purpose, it is difficult to see how Wi-Fi 
transmissions over an unencrypted network are not “readily 
                                                          
 165. See supra Part II.C. 
 166. See Orin Kerr, District Court Rules That the Wiretap Act Does Not 
Prohibit Intercepting Unencrypted Wireless Communications, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Sept. 6, 2012, 7:08 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/09/06/
district-court-rules-that-the-wiretap-act-does-not-prohibit-intercepting-
unencrypted-wireless-communications/ (“The issue under 2511(2)(g)(i) is what 
the designers intended users to be able to do, not what someone can do 
contrary to the designer’s intentions.”). 
 167. See id. 
1180 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:2 
 
accessible to the general public” under the phrase’s ordinary 
meaning. By adopting such an approach, the Joffe court may 
have avoided significant criticism surrounding the holding that 
Wi-Fi transmissions are not “readily accessible” under the 
phrase’s ordinary meaning.168 
3.  Failure to Incorporate Fourth Amendment Privacy 
Principles, Clarify Which Electronic Communications Are 
Protected, and Provide Guidance Moving Forward 
As previously mentioned, the Joffe court failed to consider 
the applicability of Fourth Amendment privacy principles in 
relation to modern communication technologies.169 Although it 
would have been difficult for the court to utilize a Fourth 
Amendment analysis given the nature of the case, numerous 
other courts have begun to adopt such an analysis.170 Given the 
high profile nature of Joffe and the growing disconnect between 
old notions of privacy protection and modern technological 
issues,171 applying Fourth Amendment privacy principles to 
Wi-Fi communications may have gone a long way towards 
updating and enhancing our current online privacy 
protections.172 
Throughout the Joffe opinion, the court seemingly tried to 
jam Wi-Fi transmissions into a definition that would bring it 
under the Wiretap Act’s protection. This approach represents 
more of a patch, as opposed to a long-term solution, for 
addressing the gaps in our current privacy protection 
framework as applied to new communication technologies. 
Such an approach simultaneously fails to provide guidance to 
Congress or lower courts and creates uncertainty for security 
                                                          
 168. See, e.g., Wi-Fi Isn’t Radio!?, KISMET (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.blog.kismetwireless.net/2013/09/wi-fi-isnt-radio.html (“[T]he ruling 
seems to think it’s difficult to monitor Wi-Fi . . . . I’m not too confident about 
that assertion.”). 
 169. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 170. See, e.g., supra note 106. 
 171. Cf. Strachan, supra note 57, at 3 (arguing that “current tort law is 
inadequate for such technologically advanced legal issues”); see also S. REP. 
No. 99-541, at 5 (1986) (“[T]he law must advance with the technology to 
ensure the continued vitality of the fourth amendment.”). 
 172. See infra Part III.C.3; cf., e.g., Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 
32, at 21 (arguing that the primary concern in passing the ECPA centered on 
individual privacy protection utilizing Fourth Amendment privacy protections 
as a touchstone to keep protections of electronic communications in line with 
the Fourth Amendment). 
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researchers and similarly situated individuals.173 The primary 
purpose of the Wiretap Act is to effectively protect the privacy 
of communications generally, and not simply Wi-Fi 
communications.174 Cabining the opinion to Wi-Fi 
transmissions and analyzing the case solely as a problem of 
statutory interpretation failed to resolve lingering uncertainty 
as to what types of modern electronic communications are 
protected by the Wiretap Act. 
B. POTENTIAL POLICY RAMIFICATIONS 
In addition to doing little to resolve the lingering 
uncertainty surrounding the applicability of the Wiretap Act to 
other forms of modern electronic communications, Joffe may 
encourage various detrimental policy ramifications. 
A sizeable and ever-growing market currently exists for 
location-based services.175 The fact that the development of 
geolocation technology has outpaced domestic statutory privacy 
protections in the United States176 makes the billion-dollar 
market for location-based services particularly troubling. Of 
even more concern is that in the wake of Google’s Wi-Fi 
debacle, companies such as Apple and Google have begun 
crowdsourcing the collection of location data to millions of 
smartphone users.177 Under Android default privacy settings, 
                                                          
 173. One of the primary negative technological implications of the court’s 
decision is that individuals seeking to capture unencrypted Wi-Fi packets for 
legitimate research purposes may now face liability under the Wiretap Act. 
Wi-Fi Isn’t Radio!?, supra note 168. 
 174. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating the 
objective of the ECPA was to protect against the interception of electronic 
communications); S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (amending the Wiretap Act to 
protect against electronic communication interception in light of changes in 
new computer technologies); see also Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 
32, at 33 (noting that all previous amendments to the Wiretap Act were 
passed to keep pace with new technologies and to protect emerging forms of 
communication). 
 175. See supra note 42. 
 176. Chow, supra note 37, at 62. 
 177. Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 36 (“Google and Apple are 
gathering location information as part of their race to build massive databases 
capable of pinpointing people’s locations via their cellphones.”); see also In re 
Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1373 (J.P.M.L. 
2011) (“These actions share factual questions arising out of the manner in 
which Google’s Android operating system (Android OS) or apps downloaded to 
devices running the Android OS collect, store and/or transfer user 
information, including location information.”). 
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smartphones report GPS locations and available Wi-Fi 
networks (among other things) to Google’s collection systems.178 
A similar process occurs on Apple’s iPhone.179 Companies then 
use the geolocation data to create large databases of Wi-Fi 
hotspots.180 
In the past, most data about people’s behavior over 
wireless networks have been collected from PCs and generally 
could only be tied to a certain city or zip code.181 The increasing 
popularity of Wi-Fi enabled smartphones, however, allows user 
data to be collected with much greater precision to specific 
locations.182 Moreover, a number of popular smartphone apps 
use location and personal data more aggressively than Google 
or Apple, occasionally sharing such data with third parties 
without the user’s knowledge or consent.183 Such practices 
demonstrate the enormous potential for abuse presented by 
new forms of electronic communication technology in the 
absence of updated statutory protections.184 
Without the express statutory protection of Wi-Fi 
communications sent over unencrypted networks, there exists a 
real possibility that we may incidentally chill the use and 
development of new Wi-Fi technology.185 It is logical to expect 
that if one’s bank account statements, e-mails, and passwords 
accessed over an unencrypted Wi-Fi network are held to be 
“readily available to the general public,” that the use of such 
technology will decline. This may be especially true in light of 
the fact that reputational privacy harms created by online 
                                                          
 178. Chow, supra note 37, at 71. 
 179. An unencrypted file on iPhones that recorded where the phone has 
been—and when—was discovered, with the collected data stored by default. 
Angwin & Valentino-Devries, supra note 36. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Although the example is a bit extreme, a man was able to obtain the 
social security number and work address of a female through a database 
company, and then proceeded to go to the female’s workplace and kill her. 
Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1923. 
 185. See EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 33 (“Holding that unsecure Wi-Fi 
communications are not protected from interception under the Wiretap Act 
would place unreasonable burdens on Wi-Fi users.”). 
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electronic communications may very well be more tangible and 
permanent than ever.186 
Along the same vein as other courts that have dealt with 
online privacy protections, Joffe did not take into consideration 
the importance of a typical Wi-Fi network user’s understanding 
of how Wi-Fi works and their expectations of privacy when 
communicating over a Wi-Fi network.187 A typical user who 
accesses a neighbor’s unsecured network clearly knows that the 
network itself is not secure, yet because of a limited 
understanding of Wi-Fi technology and the accompanying 
security risks, such a user still expects private communications 
to remain secure.188 
Although steps can be taken to secure Wi-Fi networks, 
typical users often find it difficult to activate or enable such 
features.189 The disconnect between the general public’s 
understanding of Wi-Fi technology and the accompanying 
security risks,190 the widely held expectation of privacy in 
private communications transmitted over a Wi-Fi network, and 
our outdated statutory privacy protections can best be resolved 
by updating the Wiretap Act to expressly protect certain types 
of modern electronic communications. Congress must start 
taking into account the modern social contexts in which private 
communications are shared online, and the reasonable 
expectations the general public has about this shared 
information.191 
C. A PROPOSAL: HOW AND WHY CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE 
WIRETAP ACT TO EXPRESSLY PROTECT WI-FI TRANSMISSIONS 
Instead of relying on piecemeal, judicially imposed 
resolutions to effectively protect modern electronic 
communications, Congress should focus on amending the 
                                                          
 186. Sanchez Abril, supra note 75, at 87. 
 187. See, e.g., Potnuru, supra note 12, at 105–07 (explaining the distinction 
between a user’s expectations regarding Wi-Fi access and use, and the 
expectation that data sent over Wi-Fi networks will remain private). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See, e.g., id. at 105 (“Users . . . are typically unaware that data 
transmitted over such unsecured Wi-Fi networks can still be intercepted 
unless the data is somehow still encrypted.”). 
 191. Cf. Richards & Solove, supra note 89, at 1922 (providing suggestions 
to reform tort law to address current privacy problems). 
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Wiretap Act to expressly protect Wi-Fi communications and 
similar electronic communications.192 Since the inception of the 
Wiretap Act, last amended by the ECPA in 1986, the 
technological landscape has clearly undergone significant 
changes. Privacy problems today are much different than those 
of yesterday, and the paramount goal of any amendment 
should be to remove the current unpredictability and 
uncertainty surrounding privacy protections of modern 
electronic communications.193 Any amendment must be 
carefully designed in order to account for inevitable future 
technological developments in addition to increasingly 
sophisticated packet sniffing technology. In the words of 
Warren and Brandeis, “the elasticity of our law . . . which has 
enabled it to meet the wants of an ever changing 
society . . . ha[s] been its greatest boast.”194 
1. The Content/Non-Content Distinction 
To provide comprehensive protection for modern forms of 
electronic communication, including Wi-Fi transmissions, the 
Wiretap Act should be amended to incorporate a content/non-
content distinction for liability. Essentially, any electronic 
communications consisting merely of non-content data would 
be considered “readily accessible” and thus exempt from 
Wiretap Act protection, whereas the interception of content 
data would give rise to Wiretap Act liability. For example, 
when looking at an e-mail, the actual text and substance of the 
e-mail itself would be considered content data and protected 
under the Wiretap Act. On the other hand, an e-mail’s 
addressing information would be considered non-content data 
and therefore “readily accessible to the general public” under 
G1. Such an approach not only maintains the old function of 
offline privacy protections within a new technological 
environment,195 but also conforms to the general public’s 
                                                          
 192. After all, new technology gives rise to new privacy problems. Solove, 
supra note 75, at 483. 
 193. See Solove, supra note 75, at 564; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 90, 
at 193. 
 194. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 90, at 193. 
 195. See Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A 
General Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1017–18 (2010) (replacing the 
inside/outside distinction applicable to offline privacy protection with a 
content/non-content distinction for online privacy protection). 
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reasonable expectations of privacy.196 Encouragingly, recent 
court decisions have pointed towards adopting a content/non-
content distinction.197 
2. Imposing New Requirements on Device Manufacturers 
 Currently, factory default settings for the majority of Wi-
Fi equipment is set to operate in an open, unsecured 
manner.198 Therefore, unless a user manually enables the 
available security features, Wi-Fi networks continue to run as 
an unencrypted network. As mentioned earlier, much of the 
general public either lacks the technical knowledge to secure 
their Wi-Fi network, or simply may be unaware of the privacy 
risks involved with operating an unsecured network.199 
Furthermore, security standards for Wi-Fi networks often 
change, which places a heavy burden on even tech-savvy 
consumers to keep up with the current standards.200 
A relatively easy way to address the gap between the 
general public’s understanding of Wi-Fi technology and 
expectations that their Internet communications will remain 
private would be to statutorily require manufacturers and 
developers of Wi-Fi devices to provide secure default settings. 
Statutory requirements would go a long way towards 
protecting an individual’s privacy online, and would address a 
root cause of the online privacy problem. Despite the absence of 
such statutory regulations, Wi-Fi device manufacturers have 
already begun to ship devices that provide secure default 
settings.201 
3. Applying Offline Fourth Amendment Principles to the 
Online World 
On top of imposing new statutory requirements for 
electronic communication device manufacturers instituting a 
content/non-content distinction, Congress and the judiciary 
                                                          
 196. See supra Part III.B. 
 197. Kerr, supra note 195, at 1022. 
 198. E.g., Potnuru, supra note 12, at 94. 
 199. Id. at 94–95. The EPIC notes that out of the users who decide to 
implement a password to protect their Wi-Fi networks, only fifty-nine percent 
of such users implement passwords meeting basic criteria for strength and 
privacy protection. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 26. 
 200. EPIC Brief, supra note 15, at 26. 
 201. Wi-Fi Isn’t Radio!?, supra note 168. 
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should be cognizant of the benefits offline Fourth Amendment 
principles can bring to the online world. By applying Fourth 
Amendment principles in a tech-neutral fashion through the 
content/non-content distinction,202 the use of such principles to 
provide online privacy protection becomes much easier. 
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States established a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, determining that privacy 
protects people and not places.203 Later, the Court delineated a 
two-part test in United States v. Jacobsen asking whether an 
individual sought to preserve an area as private, and whether 
the individual’s expectation of privacy is one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable.204 The principles 
established by the Court in Katz and Jacobsen are equally 
applicable to the online world, focusing on a user’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy in their electronic communications as 
opposed to whether certain electronic communication devices 
may be manipulated (such as through a packet sniffer) to 
become readily accessible.205 Recently, the Court held in United 
States v. Jones that the transmission of electronic signals 
remain subject to the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy 
test.206 The holding in Jones certainly represents a step in the 
right direction, and hopefully signals the willingness of the 
Court to protect modern forms of electronic communication. 
As this Comment has argued, the general public’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy in Internet communications 
should parallel our statutory privacy protections. Additionally, 
one of the primary goals in passing the ECPA was to keep the 
                                                          
 202. See Kerr, supra note 195, at 1007–08 (“[T]he contents of online 
communications ordinarily should receive Fourth Amendment protection 
but . . . non-content information should not be protected.”). 
 203. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–54, 361 (1967). 
 204. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117, 122, 125 (1984). 
 205. For example, in Kyllo, the Court held that the use of thermal imaging 
devices to detect heat sources emanating from a home constituted a Fourth 
Amendment search requiring a warrant. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 
39 (2001). As opposed to focusing on the manipulation of a device (the use of 
thermal imaging to see what normally would not be readily accessible to the 
general public), the Court utilized the principles established in Katz and 
Jacobsen to find a breach of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy. See id. 
(“We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws ‘A firm line at the entrance 
to the house’ . . . . That line, we think, must be not only firm, but also bright—
which requires clear specification of those methods of surveillance that 
requires a warrant.”). 
 206. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). 
2014] ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION 1187 
 
protections of electronic communications in line with the 
Fourth Amendment.207 Through the application of offline 
Fourth Amendment privacy principles, our protection for 
electronic communications will have the adaptability necessary 
to combat evolving privacy threats just as offline privacy 
protections have adapted to the development of post mail, cars, 
and telephones throughout history.208 
CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that our society’s technological and 
communications landscape has changed dramatically since the 
enactment of the ECPA in 1986. Cell phones have replaced 
landlines, e-mails have superseded snail mail, and pagers are 
now ancient technology. While one would be hard pressed to 
argue that technological advancements have made 
communication more difficult, the notion that new technologies 
create new privacy problems cannot be overstated. 
The court’s holding in Joffe with respect to Wi-Fi 
transmissions sent over an unencrypted wireless network is a 
step in the right direction. However, in order to bring statutory 
privacy protections in line with current communication 
technologies, much work remains to be done. Requiring 
manufacturers and developers to create devices with secure 
default settings, adapting offline Fourth Amendment privacy 
principles to the modern online world, and a content/non-
content distinction would go a long way towards a needed 
modernization of the Wiretap Act. 
 
                                                          
 207. H.R. REP. No. 99–647, at 16–19, 31 (1986). A paramount concern of 
the ECPA was to provide individual privacy protection using Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections as a touchstone. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
supra note 32, at 21. 
 208. Cf. Kerr, supra note 195, at 1048 (arguing that this approach would 
provide much needed flexibility for the protection of modern electronic 
communications). If an unopened letter’s contents received by snail mail is 
still considered private in the hands of a recipient, why do some consider an e-
mail in the hands of a recipient no longer private? Cf. Haynes, supra note 79, 
at 625–26 (explaining that employer policy and email service agreements may 
severely limit privacy protection). 
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